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For  governments  ln  developLng  countrles,  an important  policy  objeetlve
is  the  creatlon  of an environment  that  attracts  capital  to  high-return  fixed
investment  projects. Like  more  advanced  countries,  these  sconomies  seek  the
increases  in  labor  productivity  and  living  standArde  that  capital  deepening
brings. For  many reasons,  however,  the  design  of government  policy  toward
investment  in  less  developed  countries  is  both  more  critical  and  more  complex.
First,  such  countries  may lack  fully  functioning  internal  capital
markets,  making  it  difficult  to  measure  the  cost  of capital  for  new  projects.
Second,  the  inadequacy  of  domestic  capital  may force  a significant  dependence
on foreign  direct  investment,  which  requires  a more  complete  involvement  on
the  part  of the  investor  than  simply  supplying  funds. Third,  such  countrLes
typically  impose  more  significant  trade  and  production  distortions  in the  form
of excise  taxes,  tariffs,  quotas  snd  restrictions,  for  which  account  must  be
taken  in estimating  the  incentives  facing  a  potential  investment.  Fourth,
certain  types  of investment  incentives  require  an  administrative
infrastructure  that  may  be absent  in  all  but the  most  developed  countries.
Finally,  the  governments  in these  countries  may lack  the  credibility  needed  to
convince  investors  to  respond  to  an announced  change  in  policy.
Though  the  problems  of policy  design  are  considerable,  so are  the
potential  social  returns  from  an appropriate  investment  climate. This  paper
develops  measures  of the  incentive  to invest  that  can  be  used to  evaluate
existing  policies  and  guide  the  design  of new  ones,  taking  account  of the
complications  just  mentioned.  The  next  section  introduces  the  basic  notation
and  modelling  assumptions,  while  subsequent  sections  develop  the  model  and  its
implications  more  fully.
1IL  Tb.  3.1
A.  Th Usar Coat of  Canital
To  evaluate  the  incentive  to  invest,  we  consider  the  decisions  of  a  firm
that  uses  a single  capital  Input,  labor  and  intermediate  inputs  in  the
production  process.  The  simplifying  assumptions that  capital  and  labor  are
homogenevous  are  not  critical  for  most  purposes  of  analysis. Initially,  we
vill  also  assume  that  the  firm's  investments  are  riLkless,  and  that  it  faces  a
constant  tax  system  with  full  loss  offset,  ha perfect  certainty  about  the
future,  may  adjust  capital  instantaneously,  and  is  perfectly  competitive  (i.e.
takes  all  prices  as  given).  Though these  restrictions  are  often  made  in
analyzing  investment  incentives,  they  influence  the  results  considerably  and
are  particularly  inappropriate  in  the  present  context.  They  are  imposed
initially  for  purposes  of  exposition  and  to  permit  a  comparison  of  this
paper's  approach  to  those  found  elsewhere.
The model's  notation  is  summarized  in  Table  1. We  examine  a  firm  that
produces  gross  output  X using  capital,  K,  labor,  L and  inputs  M according  to
the  following  relationship:
(1)  X - X(K,L,M)
where  X(.)  is  a  general  production  function  with  nonincreasing  returns  to
scale.
Let  r  be  the  real  discount  rate  that  the  firm  uses  in  valuing  future  cash
flows  from  the  investment  project.  As discussed  in  Auerbach  (1983b),  this  may
be  constructed  as  a  weighted  average  of  the  real  costs  of  debt  and  equity
finance.  For  example, in  a  closed  economy without  an  indexed  tax  system,  the
2formula  for  v would  be:
(2)  r  - bL(Il-.)  - ws + (l-b)p/(1  )
vhere  1  is  the  nomlnal  lnterest  rate,  r  is  the  corporate  tax  rate  against
which  interest  payments  are  normally  tax  deductible,  is  l  the  real  discount
rate  of  equlty-holders,  *  ls  the  tax  rate  effectively  applied  to  real  equlty
returns,  a  is  the  inflation  rate,  and  b is  the  fraction  of  the  project
flnanced  vith  debt. The  construction  of  thls  measure  depends  on  a  nuober  of
lnstitutional  factors,  such  as  the  source  of  marglnal  equity  funds,  for  this
determines  the  extent  to  which  the  tax  rate  on  dividends  actually  exerts  a
marginal  impact.  In  less  developed  countries,  calculation  of  the  relevant
interest  rate,  as  well  as  the  lmportance  of  foreign  lnvestors,  may  be  more
slgnlflcant  questlons.  These  lssues  are  dlscussed  further  below.  For  the
moment,  the  analysls  simply  takes  the  de nrmination  of  r  as  given.  Let  the
prlces  of  output,  materlals  and  capltal  goods  that  the  company  faces  be  p,  v
and  g,  respectlvely,  and  let  w  be  the  wage  rate. Because  of  taxes  and  other
distortions  ln  product  and  Lactor  markets,  these  wlll  not  necessarily  be
observed  *marketu  prlces.  They  should  simply  be  lnterpreted  as  the  effective
marginal  prlces  that  firms  face  for  the  assoclated  commodities.
Let  r  be  the  present  value  of  the  after-tax  cash  flow  attrlbutable  to
depreciatLon  allowances,  lnvestment  grants  and  lnvestment  tax  credits  received
by  the  firm  per  dollar  of  new  investment.  That  is,  if  grants  and  credits  k
are  recelved  immediately  and  depreciatlon  deductions  D(t-s)  are  received  at
each  date  t  after  the  initial  lnvestment  at  date  s,  then
rZ  -(r+w)(t-s)
(3)  r  - k + rz - k + Js  f...  D(t-s)  dt
3There  are  many types  of  investmnt  incentives  used  in  practice.  Though some
ore  more complicated,  most  can  be  expressed  using  this  framework.  This  is
discussed  below.
The  zorporat!on's  problem  of  maximizing  the  wealth  of  its  shareholders  at
date  s  may  then  be  shown (Auerbach  198?  e to  be  equivalent  to  maximizing:
a  -(r+wr (t-s)
(4)  Vs  Js  a  lr)lptX(KtLtMt)-tLt-vtMt  gt(1-n)It)dt
where  Itis  the  firm's  investment  at  date  t. Under  the  famIliar  assumption
that  capital  decays  exponentially  at rate  6, the  avolution  of  the  capital
stock  obeys  the  expression:
(5)  Kt  K  It  ,  6Kt
The  firm  chooses  I, L, and  M at  each  date  after  t  in  order  to  maximize
the  function  V  . In  order  to  focus  on  the  investment  decision,  it  will
sometimes  be  useful  to  consider  this  decision  conditional  oo  the  optimal
decisions  with  respect  to  labor  and  material  inputs.  Since  each  is  a  vatiable
factor  of  production,  the  optimization  produces  for  each  yields  the  standard
rule  of  setting  equal  contemporaneous  marginal  revenues  and  costs  at  each  date
t  >  s:
(6)  XLt  wpt
(7)  x  -t  m vt/Pt
4The  decision  rules  (6)  and  (7)  provide  two equations  in  the  variables  L,
X  sod  K.  Hence,  they  may  be used to  define  L  and  K  implicitly  in  terms  of  K.
That  _J,  froo&  (5)  and (7)  we may  obtain  expressions:
(8)  L*  - L(K,  w/p,  v/p)
(9)  M* - M(K,  w/p,  v/p)
which  may  be used to  obtain  a  production  function  of  K alone:
(10)  F_(K)  - X(K,L*,1H*)  Lt
A time  subscript  must  be attached  to the  new  function  F(.)  because  of its
dependence  on the  real  wage  w/p  and  the  real  price  of  materials  v/p.
Using  the  function  Ft(.),  we may rewrite  the  firm's  optimization  problem
at date  s  as:
(^11)  max  V5 - Js  e  (Mr)ptF(Kt)  g (l.r)(K  +6K  )) dt
which  yields  the  Euler  equation  familiar  from  the  literatut-
I  t  (r + 6)  l)
(12)  Ft'(Kt)  - Pt( (l-r)
The  right-hand  side  of (12)  has traditionally  been  called  the  user  Cost
of capital  (e.g.  Jorgenson  1963),  for  it  defines  the  shadow  price  to  whichi  the
marginal  product  of capital  should  be set  equal. However,  wiLh  other  factors
of production  the  desired  capital  stock  is a function  of all input  prices,  not
just the  direct  input  price  of capital. Thus,  if  one is interested  in
5knowing  the  capital  stock  Itself,  rather  than  its  marginal  product,  an
alternative  formulation  of  the  user  cost  wili  prove  more  uswfu:.
For  purposes  of exposition,  let  us assume  that  Ft0()  ts  the  saparable
form:l
(13)  Ft(K)  - O(wt/pt,  vt/pt)G(K)  - StG(K)
Then,  the  first-order  condition  (12)  may  be rewritten:
g (r  + s)(l-r)/(l-r)
(14)  G'(K  t) - ct m  =-:  etpt
Because  of the  assumption  that  the  firm  can  adjust  its  capital  stock
instantaneously,  expression  (14)  is  a solution  for  the  capital  stock  at date t
and,  given  the  initial  capital  stock,  the  rate  of investment  as well. 2
Therefore,  since  the  function  G(*) is  time-invariant,  the  right-hand  side  of
(14)  represents  a sufficient  statistic  for  the  incentive  to  use capital  in
production.  We  may think  of this  as the  "full"  user  cost  of capital. It
incorporates  effects  on investment  working  directly  through  the  effective
rental  price  of  capital  as  well  as indirectly  through  the  costs  of other
factors  of production.
B.  The  Effective  Tax  Rate
Many researchers  (e.g.  Auerbach  1983a,  King  and  Fullerton  1984)  have
found  it  useful  to  summarize  the  effects  of the  tax  system  on investment
through  an "effective  tax  rate"  calculation.  Though  most  of the  literature
has  focused  on developed  countries,  the  approach  has also  been carefully
applied  in the  development  context  (Pellechio  1987). The thought  experiment
6giving  rise  to this  measure  Is  to  ask  what  rate  cf tax  applied  to a  broad.
based  income  measure  would  lead  to the  came  wedge  between  after-tax  and
before-tax  returns  as is  actually  observed. Put  differently,  for  a  given  user
cost  of cipital,  what  rate  of tax  on broad-based  or "true  economic"  income
would  lead  to the  observed  after-iax  return.
Despite  its  apparent  simplicity,  the  concept  does  not  give  rise  to a
unique  definition,  with  the  measure  depending  on  which  taxes  are  included  in
the  calculation  and  what level  of after-tax  or  before-tax  rate  of return  is
used  as  a  benchmark. Moreover,  the  calculation  of an  effective  tax  rate  alone
does  not  provide  enough  information  to infer  the  effects  of tax  policy  on
investment.  Since  the  user  cost  of  capital  will result  from  adding  the  tax
wedge  to the  after-tax  rate  of return,  it  is important  to  know  not  only  how
big the  tax  wedge  is  but to  what  extent  it leads  to  a higher  before-tax  return
rather  than  a lower  after-tax  return. Even  in  small  open  economies  that  must
take  world  prices  and  rates  of return  as  given,  not  all  taxes  will
necessarily  be fully  reflected  in  a higher  cost  of capital. Some  will  be
borne  by imperfectly  mobile  factors  (such  as land  and  labor). Even  with
perfect  capital  mobility  some  capital  income  taxes  may  be shifted  abroad  if
they  are  credited  by foreign  governments.
In  spite  of these  limitations,  the  effective  tax  rate  concept  is  a
popular  one  that  can  be useful  for  certain  purposes,  particularly  in  comparing
the  relative  incentive  to invest  in  different  assets.  Therefore,  we will
describe  in somewhat  more  detail  how it  fits  into  the  current  framework.
One  may think  of the  total  tax  wedge  affecting  the  return  to  capital  as
being  divided  into  two  parts. The  first  is the  wedge  between  the  required
rate  of return  r  and the  corporation's  return  before  tax. The  second  is the
wedge  between  r  and the  return  to investors  after  AUl  taxes. The first  wedge
7is  t'a  effective  rate  of corporate  tax,  indicating  how  provisions  directly
affectLng  investment  affect  the  corporate  tax  base.  One  may  also think  of
this  as  the  effective  rate  of tax  at the  corporate  level  for  an equity-
fLnanced  Investment,  ignoring  any  provisions  permitting  a deduction  for
dividends  paid.
To calculate  the  effective  corporate  tax  rate,  one  would  estimate  how the
tax  rate  r in  expression  (14)  would  need to  change  to offset  the  repeal  of
investment  incentives  and  the  imposition  of a system  of economic  depreciation
allowances.  This  would  involve  varying  r  to offset  the  replacement  of r  with
the  present  value  of  economic  depreciation  deductions,  r6/(r+6),  holding  al'
other  terms  in  the  expression  fixed. The  resulting  effective  tax  rate
expression  is (see  Auerbach  1983a):
r(r+)(1-r)/(1-r)  - 61  r
(15)  ec  - (r+6)(1-r)/(i-r)  - 6
where  the  denominator  is  the  before-tax  return  to  capital  (equal  to the
before-tax  rate  of return,  net  of actual  depreciation)  and  the  numerator  is
the  "tax  wedge"  between,  this  return  and the  corporate  cost  of funds  r.  This
expression  provides  the  standard  results  that  immediate  write-off  of assets
(r-r)  leads  to a zero  effective  tax  rate  and  that  with  economic  depreciation
allowances  (for  which  r-6/(r+6)),  ec  - r.
A more comprehensive  effective  tax  rate  measure  (see  King  and  Fullerton
1984)  is one  that  accounts  not  only  for  investment-oriented  provisions  at the
corporate  level,  but  also  the  second  wedge  discussed  above,  between  the  rate
of return  to firms  after  corporate  taxes  and  the  rate  of return  to  savers.
This  second  wedge  would  account  for  interest  deductibility  at the  corporate
level  and  taxes  paid  by individuals  or other  entities  receiving  the  corporate-
8source  income. To get  a  total  wedge  equal  to the  sun  of the  two  vedges,  one
would  add  to the  gap  betveen  the  before-tax  corporate  return  and  the  corporate
cost  of funds  r thle  gap  between  r and  the  rats  of return  to suppliers  of
funds,  say  s.
To calculate  this  total  sffective  tax  rate,  one  must  express  r in terms
of the  net  return  to  savers. This is  achieved  by substituting  expression  (2)
into  equation  (14)  and  further  expressing  the  interest  rate  I in terms  of the
not  real  return  to  bondholders,  say  n, and  the  income  tax  rate  on interest
received,  say  tp
The  result  is an  expression  for  r in  terms  off the  underlying  real
raturns  to equity  and  debt  after  all  taxes,  j  and  n, that  can  be substituted
into  (15)  to determine  the  total  effective  tax  rata hat encoiapasses  the  tax
provisions  embodied  in  r,  the  corporate  tax  rate  t and  the  individual  tax
rates  0 and  tp  Contrary  to  the  previous  case,  one  would  measure  the  tax
wedge  re'ative  to  p  and  n rather  than  r.  Here the  calculation  depends  on
which,  of a  variety  of  assumptions  one  makes  concerning  the  ielationship  of the
two  net  rates  of return,  p  and  n.  The  choice  depends  on which  concept  of
financial  equilibrium  one  chooses  (King  and  Fullerton  1984). For  the "fixed
s"  case in which  these  net  returns  are  assumed  to  be equal  (i.e.,  p  - n  -
s)3,  this  broader  effectlve  tax  rate  equals:
.r(r4-8)(l.r)/(l-t)  . al  -
(17)  OT - (r+6)(l.r)/(l.r)  - 6
9The  numerator  of (17)  is  the  "total"  tax  wedge,  incorporating  the  effects
of interest  deductibility  and  personal  taxes  that  manifest  themselves  through
the  relationship  of the  corporation's  cost  of funds  r and  the  net return  to
asset  owners,  a.
The  effective  tax  ra'  OT describes  the  total  tax  burden  on domestic
investm.nt,  domestically  financed. In a  closed  economy,  it  would  therefore  be
informative  about  the  impact  of zhe  tax  system  on investment. In such  an
economy,  there  is  no distinction  between  taxes  on saving  and taxes  on
investment.  In a  world  with  open  economies,  however,  saving  and investment
may  occur  in  different  places. Policies  aimed  at encouraging  saving  in  a
country  need  not  encourage  investment  there,  but  may  simply  cause  more  capital
to flow  abroad. To the  extent  that  the  marginal  investor  supplies  funds  from
abroa-d,  a different  calculation  that  distinguishes  taxes  on saving  and
investment  may  be necessary.
One  approach  would  be to  consicer  the  tax  treatment  of equity  and  debt
owned  by foreigners,  and  include  these  in the  calculation  as  well.  For
example,  Andersson  et al (1990)  calculate  the  effective  tax  rates  eT for
investment  in the  United  States  financed  not  only  by domestic  debt  and  equity
funds,  but  also  by debt  and  equity  supplied  via portfolio  investment  from
Japan. They likewise  calculate  the  effeccive  tax  rates  on Japanese
investment  financed  in  Japan  and  from  the  United  States.
The  basic  question  to  be addressed  is  how the  firm's  cost  of funds  r
relates  to the  required  returns  to equity  and  debt  p and  n when  such funds
come  from  abroad.  (For  a small  developing  economy,  the  returns  p  and  n may  be
taken  as fixed,  so that  the  associated  gap  between  the  net  returns  p  and  n and
the  gross  return  r translates  directly  into  a  higher  cost  of  capital.)
10The  ansver  to this  question  depends  on  both the  host country's  tax
treatment  of such  capital  flows  as  vell as  the  home country's  mechanism  for
crediting  forelgn  taxes  pald.  This,  in  turn,  depends  on the  type  of entity
that  is  supplying  the  capital,  for  foreign  direct  investment  by corporations
is  treated  differently  than  portfolio  investment  by individuals.  Although
Andersson  et_al  treat  the  case  of  portfolio  investment,  foreign  direct
investment  and investment  via  financial  intermediaries  represent  a more
significant  portion  of the  flows  between  the  United  States  and  Japan. This
must  be even  more  true  of the  capital  flows  into  most  developing  countries.
It therefore  seems  most  appropriate  to consider  the  case  in which  the
investment  is  by a foreign  corporation.  We will  discuss  the  implications  of
this  assumption  further  below.
C.  The  Effective  Tax  Rate  and  the  User  Cost  of Ca2ital.  More  Broadly  Defined
For  developed  economies  such  as Japan  and  the  United  States,  the  major
effects  of policy  on the incentive  to invest  may  well  come  through  the  tax
system. Hence,  the  use  of the  various  effective  tax  rate  measures  already
discussed  may  suffice. In developing  countries,  the  most important  effects  of
policy  may  not  work  through  the  tax  system  at all,  or may  do so indirectly,
rather  than  through  capital  income  taxes.
In terms  of the  user  cost  of capital  expression  on the  right-hand  side  of
(14),  we may  distinguish  between  policies  that  affect  the  price  of capital
goods,  g, the  required  rate  of return,  r, the  output  price  p and the
productivity  term  8, through  the  effective  real  wage  w/p  or the  effective  cost
of  material  inputs  v/p.
Policies  affecting  g  and  r may  be seen  as the  equivalent  of capital
income  taxes,  since  they  influence  the  gap  between  the  gross  and  net  returns
11to  capital. Put  another  way, they  appear  only  in the  first-order  condition
for  capital.  (12),  and  not  those  for  labor  and  materials,  (6)  and (7). For
purposes  of  measuring  relative  costs  of capital  and  other  inputs,  one  would
add  only  such  policies  to those  previously  considered,  and the  way  of doing  so
is  straightforward.  However,  if  one  wishes  to  measure  the  incentive  to
invest,  then  effects  on p,  w/p and  v/p  matter,  too,  since  each  of these
variables  appears  on the  right-hand  side  of (14). For  example,  a subsidy  to
labor  or a  protective  tariff  on an  industry's  output  may  well increase
investment.  While  it is  misleading  to  equate  such  policies  with  a reduction
in  capital  income  taxes,  it  is  important  to -onsider  them  along  with policies
directed  at capital  specifically.
Some  examples  of  how such  policies  affect  the  cost  of capital  dafined  in
(14)  follows.
1.  Indirect  taxes
If materials  goods  face  on ad  valorem  tax  rate  tm,  then  the  real
materials  cost  v appearing  as an argument  of e(.)  (see  (13)), would  equal  (1
+  tm)vw,  if  vw if the  price  net  of tax  (subscripted  by w to indicate  that  this
will  be the  world  price  if  other  price  distortions  are  absent). Assuming  that
indirect  taxes  are  not  applied  to  exports,  they  will  have  no effect  on the
expression  for  the  output  price  p, which  will equal  the  world  price  Pw
2.  Tariffs
A tariff  on materials  inputs  at rate  T  affects  the  cost  of materials  to
the  firm  just  as  an indirect  tax  would,  v - (1  +  T  m)vw.  However,  a tariff  at
rate  Tp an output  would  raise  the  output  price,  relative  to the  world  price,
to  p - (1  + T  p)pw.  As is  well  known,  this  output  price  effect  is  equivalent
12to  a  general  production  subsidy  to the  firm.
3.  Dual  Exchange  Rates
If  there  is a controlled  and  an  uncontrolled  sector  in the  exchange
market,  we  may treat  the  difference  between  the  two  exchange  rates  as a
general  trade  intervention.  Importers  forced  to  buy foreign  currency  at the
(presumably  higher)  controlled  rate  are  essentially  facing  a tariff.
4.  Quantity  Controls
In  general,  each  type  of quantity  control  has an analogous  price
distortion.  A well-known  example  is  tariff  and  quotas. In this  case,  the
challenge  is  to identify  the  tariff-equivalent  of the  quota,  which  requires
some  assumption  about  the  price-elasticity  of  demand  for  the  commodity  in
question.
Other  examples  of quantity  controls  occur  in  the  capital  market. Here,
one  can  estimate  the  subsidy  inherent  in targeted  funds  by comparing  the
stated  interest  rate  to  the  market  interest  rate,  as long  as a latter  such
rate  is  available. To the  extent  that  such  funds  are  used at the  margin,  the
implied  subsidy  rate  should  be used  to adjust  the  interest  rate  appearing  in r
(see  '2)).
5.  Imperfect  Competition
If  firms  are  not  price-takers,  this  introduces  the  possibility  of a  mark-
up of the  sales  price  p over  marginal  cost.  The  extent  of the  mark-up  will,
of  course,  depend  on the  nature  and  degree  of imperfection  in the  product
market.
13One type  of imperfection  that  Is  relatively  easy  to  analyze  is
monopolistic  competition,  under  which  each  firm  faces  a downward-sloping
demand  curve  with price  elasticity  i,  where p  depends  both on the  overall
elasticity  of demand,  the  number  of firms,  and  the  degree  to  which  import
substitution  is  possible. In thls  case,  the  firm  behaves  as if it faces  an
output  price  p (1-  1) rather  than  p in  each  of its  factor  utilization
decisions  system. The  case  is  analogous  to that  of production  tax  at rate  v
In  summary,  policies  affecting  the  numerator  of the  right-hand  side  of
expression  (14)  are  capital-related;  whether  they  are  capital  income  taxes  as
rypically  included  in  effective  tax  rate  measures  or  policies  with similar
effects,  they  have equivalent  marginal  effects  to  a change  in the  rate  of
capital  income  taxation. In this  sense,  they  are  appropriate  for inclusion  in
an accurate  calculation  of the  'effective  tax  rate"  on capital  income.
Tax  and  nontax  policies  that  affect  the  denominator  of the  right-hand
side  of (14)  also  affect  investment  and  should  therefore  be considered  in  any
analysis  that  seeks  to  measure  the  full  effects  of policy  on investment.
Though  significant,  their  marginal  effects  differ  from  those  of  capital  income
tax  changes,  for  they  also influence  the  real  costs  of labor  and  materials.
Moreover,  because  these  polices  affect  the  attractiveness  of capital
indirectly  through  the  price  of output  or other  inputs,  their  impact  on
investment  cannot  be measured  without  additional  information  about  the
production  process. That is,  policies  that  affect  p, w/p  or v/p  all  work
through  the  term  e  in expression  (14),  and the  form  of  e  depends  on the  exact
specification  of the  production  function,  particularly  the  degree  to  which
other  inputs  are  substitutes  or  complements  for  capital.
For  example,  suppose  the  production  procE:s  requires  a fixed  ratio  of
materials  to  output  and  that  value  added  by capital  and labor  is  described  by
14a  Cobb-Douglas  function. Then  X(.)  has the  form:
(18)  X(K,  L, M) - min(AKXLP,  M/m)
for  constants  c,  P  and  m, and  8(9)  has  the  form (dropping  time  subscripts): 4
(19)  *(w/p,v/p)_tW  1/(1')  l-m(v/p)  1/(1-0)
In this  case,  both labor  and  materials  are  complementary  to  capital  in
the  production  process:  an increase  in  either  the  real  price  of materials  or
the  real  price  of labor  reduces  the  desired  capital  stock. The  elasticity  of
the  user  cost  of capital,  defined  by the  right-hand  side  of (14),  with respect
to the  real  wage is 1/(l-p);  the  elasticity  with respect  to the  real  cost  of
materials  is  m(v/p)/[l-m(v/p)).  By comparison,  the  elasticity  with respect  to
the  corporate  tax  rate  r  (holding  r constant)  is  r/(l-r).5  (For  more  general
specifications  of production,  it  will  not  even  be possible  to  express  F(s) in
the  separable  form  given  in (13)  and  the  term  e  can  only  be locally
approximated).
Up to this  point,  all  policies  discussed  have  worked  in  markets  with
fixed  world  prices. Policies  driving  a  wedge  between  such  world  prices  and
the  prices  facing  the  firm  translate  directly  into  changes  in the  user  cost  of
capital. One  must  add  the  marginal  burden  of capital  income  taxes  to the  net
returns  required  by suppliers  of funds. Likewise,  the  domestic  prices  for
output  and  inputs,  p and  v, equal  the  world  prices  plus any  tariff  or tariff-
equivalent  quantity  restriction,  such  as an import  quota,  that  is imposed
domestically.  Unlike  in  a closed  economy,  no general  equilibrium  calculations
are  necessary  to estimate  how  much  the  gross  return  or price  rises  with the
15tax. This  makes  the  resulting  effective  tax  rate  more  directly  informative
about  the  user  cost itself.
This  simplicity  is  absent  for  labor  market  interventions,  since  (for  most
countries)  labor  is  not  nearly  as  mobile  as  capital. Thus,  one  cannot
immediately  compute  the  impact  on the  real  wage  rate  and  hence  the  user cost
of capital  of tax  and  nontax  policies  that  drive  a  wedge  between  the  real  wage
received  by workers  and  the  cost  of labor  facing  firms. Incorporating  the  gap
between  gros and  nat  wages  in  a  grand  "effective  tax  rate"  computation  may,
as a result,  be extremely  misleading  if  the  incidence  of labor  income  taxes
falls  largely  on  workers  rather  than  firms.
D.  S
If  one  wishes  to  estimate  the  effects  of tax  policy  on the incentive  to
invest,  the  augmented  user  cost  expression  given  in (14)  provides  a sufficient
statistic,  given  the  modelling  assumptions  adopted  in this  section.
Traditional  measures  of the  "effective  tax  rate"  on capital  fail  in several
respects  to  provide  an equally  useful  measure.
First,  they  typically  ignore  the  separation  of saving  and  investment
decisions  and  the  importance  of international  capital  flows. Second,  they
consider  only  explicit  taxes  on capital  and  capital  income,  ignoring  both
nontax  capital  policies  (such  as targeted  lending)  and  tax  and  nontax
policies,  such  as tariffs  and  quotas,  that  indirectly  influence  the  incentive
to invest  through  their  effects  on the  prices  of outputs  and  other  inputs.
Finally,  in  emphasizing  the  magnitude  of the  tax  wedge  between  gross  and  net
returns  to  capital,  rather  than  the  level  of the  gross  return,  a given
effective  tax  rate  can  correspond  to  several  different  levels  of the  desired
capital  stock,  depending  on the  incidence  of the  taxes  in  question. A given
16tax  wedge  added to a price  that  is  fixed  in  world  markets  may reduce
investment  more  than  were the  price  determined  domestically.
While  the  analysis  to this  point  represents  a  useful  summary  of much  of
the  literature  to date,  it is  static  in  nature. It therefore  ignores  the
dynamics  of the investment  process,  a specification  of  which  is  necessary  for
empirical  work  on investment.  The  characterization  of the  investment  process
itself  can  be  particularly  important  in  cases  where  changes  in the  tax  system
are  being  considered.
III.  Changes  in  Tax  Reglie
Over  time,  the  economic  conditions  affecting  investment  may  change  quite
markedly. Among  these  economic  changes  are  shifts  in tax  regime,  caused  not
only  by policy  shifts  affecting  all  firms  but  also  by shifts  in an individual
firm's  tax  status. For  example,  a  firm  may face  a zero  marginal  tax  rate  on
its  taxable  income  for  a  period  of years  because  it is  carrving  a  large  stock
of losses  and  depreciation  allowances  forward,  and  then  become  taxable  once
again  as these  deductions  expire  or are  used  up.  Both  types  of change  in tax
regime,  economy-wide  and  firm-  or sector-specific,  can  exert  a  powerful,  if
tsmporary  impact  on investment  incentives.  Indeed,  in an  unstable  economic
environment,  such  "temporary"  effects  may  nearly  always  be present. Thus,
one should  go  beyond  examinations  of tax  systems  applicable  only in  a "long
run'  which  is  unlikely  ever  to occur.
Once  one  admits  the  importance  of changes  in economic  conditions,  the
assumption  of instantaneous  capital  stock  adjustment  made  above  becomes  even
more  restrictive. It is  clear  that  firms  will  not  cause  their  capital  stocks
to swinj  wildly  in response  to  each instantaneous  change  in the  user cost  of
capital. To  model  investment  behavior  realistically,  therefore,  it is
17necessary  to replace  this  assumptLon.  The introduction  of  convex  adjustment
costs  for  the  capital  stock  provides  such  a smoothing  incentive. 6 'he
following  analysis  follows  closely  that  first  presented  in  Auerbach  (1989).
For  the  interested  reader,  the  full  derivation  is  provided  in the  appendix.
An empirical  application  for  the  United  States  may  be found  in  Auerbach  and
Hines  (1988).
We begin  again  with  a firm  seeking  to  maximize  its  value  as in (11),  but
introduce  two  changes, First,  the  tax  parameters  may  vary over  time,  so that,
in  particular,  r,  k and  hence  r  require  time  subscripts. For  the  moment,  we
continue  to assume  perfect  certainty  about  these  tax  changes  and the  absence
of  any  risk.  Second,  we replace  the  exogenous  price  of capital  goods  g with  a
total  cost  g(l  - 60K  +  i  ),  chosen  to  give  rise  to  a simple  expression  for
the  marginal  cost  of capital  goods:
1 (20)  q - d(g[l  - 60K  +  W0(16K)]I)/dI  - g(l  + 0K)
The  term  the  0 is  an adjustment  cost  parameter,  equal  to the  percent  increase
in effective  capital  goods  prices  to the  firm  per  unit  of additional
investment.
Replacing  g in (11)  with q as  defined  in (20),  and  adding  subscripts  to
the  tax  parameters,  we obtain  the  following  Euler  equation  for  the firm,
replacing  (12):
q  (r+S)(l-r  )/p  - [q  (l-r  )/P
(21)  Ft  (K  )_t  t  t  t  t  t
t  t  (1.r)
where  the  after-tax  present  value  of investment  incentives  is:
18aZ  (r+*)(t-S)
(22)  r,  - k + Js  ta  D (t-s)  dt
Expression  (21)  is  no  more  than  a  user  cost  of  capital  that  ta'ces  explicit
account  of  expected  changes  in  the  real,  after-tax  relative  price  of  capital
goods  q(l-r)/p  (Auerbach  1983b).  However,  since  q  is  a  function  of  investment
itself,  (21)  is  a  first-order  condition  only  rather  than  a  direct  solution  for
K. To  obtain  the  latter,  one  must  substitute  the  expression  for  q  given  in
(20)  into  (21),  obtaining  a  second-order  differential  equation  in  K that  must
then  be  solved.  Because  this  equation  is  nonlinear,  a  closed  form  solution
will  not  generally  be  available.  However,  such  a  closed  form  solution  may  be
derived  if  one  linearizes  the  differential  equation  around  its  steady  state
solution. 7 The  solution  for  investment  may  be  expressed  as  a  model  of
partial  adjustment  toward  a  "desired"  capital  stock: 8
.
(23)  It  - (-  1)(Kt  Kt)  +  Kt
where  the  des'  ed  capital  stock  satisfies:
(24)  G'(Kt)  Ct -Jt2  e  s2(s-t)c  ds
the  instantaneous  cost  of  capital  term  ct  equals
(25)  ct  - gt[(r  + 6)(1-r  ).  (l-rt)
tp  (l-rt)
and  the  terms  el  (s  0)  and  02  (2  (r+6))  are  the  roots  of  the  second-order
19differential  *quation. 9 (As  before,  the  function  C(e)  is  defined  in
expression  (13)  as  the  production  function  divided  by the  term B.)
Because  the  weights  o2a 2(St) sum  to  one,  we  can  viow  expression  (24) 2
as  indicating  that  the  desired  capital  stock  that  influences  investment  at
date  t  depends  on  a  weighted  average,  Ct,  of  present  and  future  user  costs  of
capital.  Only  if  adjustment  costs  are  zero  and  hence  adjustment  is
instantaneous  (in  which  case  a2  - a)  or  if  the  cos.  of  capital  is  constant
over  time  will  the  current  cost  of  capital  be  sufficient  to  describe  the
effects  of  the  tax  system  on  lnvestment.  In  general,  forward  looking
investment  behavior  that  depends  on  the  weighted  average  of  current  and  future
costs  of  capital  may be  quite  different  from  that  implied  by  assuming  a
constant  cost  of  capital  without  changing  tax  rates.  The use  of  this  new
methodology  is  straightforward.  It  differs  from  traditlonal  specifications
primarily  in its  dependence  on  predicted  future  capital  costs  rather  than
lagged  ones.  To apply  it,  one  first  calculates  the  instantaneous  user  cost  of
capital  at each  date  t,  ct,  and  then  aggregates  these  user  costs  over  all
future  dates. The  weights  to  use in  this  aggregation  depend  on a number  of
parameters  (see  footrote  9),  not  all  of  which  are  precisely  known  (such  as
0).  Hence  experimentation  with  different  weighting  scheme  seems  called  for.
In the  firsz  step,  one  must  allow  for  potential  changcs  in  the  tax  rate  r  when
calculating  r,  and  must  also  allow  for  potential  changes  in  r  itself.
We now  provide  some  examples  to illustrate  this  approach. It is  helpful
in  making  these  examples  realistic  to  draw  them  from  the  policies  and
experiences  of  particular  countries. However,  such  examples  should  not  be
interpreted  as an  overall  evaluation  of the  tax  policies  of the  countries  in
question.
20Many  countries  have  recently  enacted  tax  reforms  aimed  at  broadening  the
tax  base  whlle  at  the  same  time  loworing  tax  rates. The effects  on Investment
of the  1986  U.S. reform  are  dlscussed  in  Auarbach  (1989).
Among  developing  countries,  Mexico  has  recently  moved  to an indexed
corporate  tax  system,  with  a  phased  reduction  in  the  corporate  tax  rate  from
42% to 35%. During  the  transition  period,  the  tax  rate  reduction  itself  has
three  effects  on the  instantaneous  user  cost  of capital  given  in  expression
(25). First,  it  reduces  the  tax  rate  term  appearing  in the  denominator,
lowering  the  cost  of capital. Second  it  reduces  the  after-tax  present  value
of  depreciation  deductions,  r  (calculated  using  (22)),  increasing  the  cost  of
capital. Third,  it  makes  r,  the  time  derivative  of r,  negative:  the  present
value  of depreciation  deductions  declines  over  the  period  as the  tax  cut is
phased  in.  This  last  effect  reduces  the  user  cost:  there  is  an incentive  to
invest  while  depreciation  allowances  may  still  be deducted  at the  higher  tax
rate. on  balance,  the  instantaneous  user  cost,  as well as the  weighted
average  of current  and  future  such  user  costs  relevant  to current  investment,
will  likely  fall,  stimulating  investment. 10 It is even  possible  that
investment  will  be stimulated  more  by a phased  reduction  in the  tax  rate
rather  than  an  immediate  one,  since  the  anticipated  decline  in  the  value  of  r,
by  itself,  stimulates  investment. 1 1 This  possibility  emphasizes  the
distinction  between  average  and  marginal  tax  rates,  between  the level  of taxes
paid  by a company  and  its  incentive  to invest. A delayed  reduction  in the  tax
rate  r  will certainly  cause  the  firm  to  pay  more taxes  in the  short  run,  even
in it  faces  a lower  cost  of capital  and  hence  invests  more.
A similar  distinction  may  be made  between  the  effects  of investment-
oriented  incentives,  such  as investment  tax  credits  and  allowances,  and  cuts
21in  the  tax  rate  r.  While  both  will spur  investment,  rate  reductions  will
reduce  tax  payments  by more,  given  the  level  of investment  stliulus,  because
they  will  also  reduce  the  taxes  the  firm  pays  from  sources  of income  other
than  new investment,  including  existing  capital  and  economic  rents.
B.  Tax  holid  v
Many  countries  provide  tax  holidays  to attract  new investment.  Tax
holidays  provide  the  investing  firm  with  an exemption  from  tax  on its
normally  taxable  income  during  some  time  period  after  the  firm's  initial
investment  is  made.  As discussed  in  Mintz  (1989),  such  a holiday  does  not
necessarily  imply  that  the  firm's  user  cost  of  capital  is  the  same  as it  would
be in the  absence  of taxation,  since  the  holiday  is  not  permanent. In
considering  whether  to invest,  the  firm  must  calculate  the  taxes  it  will  pay
on today's  asset  purchase  once  the  holiday  is  over,  as  well as the  tax
incentives  to invest  at a later  date. Neither  of those  factors  would  apply  if
the  holiday  were  permanent,  for  all  present  and  prospective  investments.
The  problem  of tax  holidays  can  be analyzed  in  exactly  the  same  manner  as
the "global"  tax  rate  change  just  considered.  The situation  is  the  same  as if
the  firm  faced  a zero  tax  rate  for  a  predetermined  length  of time,  followed  by
the  normal  rate  of tax  r, thereafter.
Once  again,  there  are  three  effects  on the  instantaneous  user  cost  of
capital  during  the  holiday  period. The  tax  rate  at the  current  date  is zero.
To the  extent  that  the  depreciation  allowances  on the  firm's  current
investment  extend  beyond  the  holiday  period,  the  present  value  of after-tax
depreciation  allowances  r  would  be reduced  but  not  eliminated. 1 2 Finally,  the
time  derivative  of this  present  value,  r,  would  be positive,  since  the
fraction  of allowances  deductible  from  tax  would  rise  as the  end  of the
22holiday  period  approached.  The  first  impact  would  be  positLve,  the  second
and  third  negative.  The  impact  on  investment  during  the  holiuay  period  would
depend  on  the  generosity  of  the  Investment  incentives  themselves.  It  is
entirely  possible  that  some  types  of  investment  would  be  discouraged.  This
woold  be  most  likely  in  cases  where  the  initial  investment  allowances  were
larger  than  concurrent  cash  flow. In  such  cases,  new  investments  would
generate  a  negative  tax  base  in  the  years  immtdiately  after  an  investment,  so
firms  would  actually  benefit  (with  respect  to  their  nDw  investment)  by  being
taxable.  See  Auerbach  (1983a).
The  revenue  cost  of  a  tax  holiday  depends  on  whether  it  applies  to  assets
already  in  place.  If  it  does  then,  like  a permanent  tax  rate  reduction,  the
tax  holiday  reduces  the  taxes  that  firms  pay  during  the  holiday  period  on
preexisting  sources  of  income  other  than  the  new  investment  that  the  policies
aim  to  encourage.  This  makes  the  tax  holiday  more  costly  than  more  targeted
investment  incentives,  such  as  investment  tax  credits  or  grants.
C.  Tax law asyuetries
Most  countries  alloo  firms  with  net  operating  losses  to  carry  these
losses  forward,  to  be  used  to  offset  subsequent  taxable  income.  Some
countries  also  allow  losses  to  be  carried  back,  providing  refunds  against
taxes  previously  paid. Firms  that  are  currently  not  paying  taxes  but  with
some  probability  will  be  doing  so  in  the  future  can  be  treated  as  if  they  are
facing  a  tax  regime  with  marginal  tax  rates  that  change  over  time. In  this
sense,  the  case  is  similar  to  the  previous  one  of  tax  holidays.  However,  in
this  case,  one  cannot  simply  assume  a  current  marginal  tax  rate  of  zero  for  a
firm  that  is  not  presently  paying  taxes.  In  present  value,  additional  income
earned  today  may  well  lead  to  a  significatit  tax  liability,  even  if  no  taxes
23are  paid  Immediately.
For  example,  suppose  a firw  has  a  tax  loss  this  year,  which  it  will  carry
forward  and,  with certainty,  use  up  next  year,  when it  will  be paying  taxes
once  again. If the  firm  generates  another  dollar  of income  this  year,  this
income  will  reduce  the  tax  loss  carried  forward  by one  dollar. This
reduction,  in  turn,  will  increase  by one  dollar  the  firm's  taxable  income  the
following  year,  since  the  size  of the  deductible  tax  loss  will  be smaller.
Hence,  the  firm  will  pay  taxes  on an additional  dollar  of income  with a one
year  delay. The  true  marginal  tax  rate  for  the  current  period,  which  one  may
think  of  as "  "shalowl  tax rate, is therefore the statutory rate, r,
discounted  for  one  period  at the  nominal  interest  rate.
OJf  course,  one  cannot  be certain  of the  date  at  which  a firm  not
currently  paying  taxes  will  begin  doing  so,  but  this  does  not  pose  a
conceptual  problem  for  the  application  of the  preceding  methodology. If  one
can  estimate  a  probability  distribution  of  when  a firm  will  begin  paying  taxes
again,  one  can  simply  multiply  the  tax  rate  for  each  date  by the  associated
probability  and  add  the  discounted  values  of these  products  together  to  obtain
today's  shadow  tax  rate. Doing  so for  each  date,  one  can  produce  a time
profile  of  shadow  tax  rates  for  a given  firm,  which  can  then  be used to
calculate  the  user  cost  of capital.
Illustrations  of this  approach  are  presented  in  Auerbach  (1983a),
Auerbach  and  Poterba  (1987)  and  Altshuler  and  Auerbach  (1989). It can  be
applied  even in  cases  where  firms  are  permitted  to carry  losses  back,  and
where  different  rules  for  carrying  forward  apply  to  different  components  of
taxable  income. In the  United  States,  for  example,  the  rules  for  carrying
forward  unused  investment  tax  credits  have  differed  from  those  applying  to
ordinary  losses. In  other  countries,  such  as Pakistan,  net  operating  losses
24exclusive  of  depreciation  allowances  can  be carried  forward  for  only  six
years,  while  unused  depreciation  allowances  themselves  can  be carried  forward
indefinitely.  Hence,  the  shadow  tax  rate  applicable  to depreciation
deductions  should  be closer  than  the  shadow  tax  rate  applicable  to ordinary
income  to the  statutory  tax  rate. In  Mexico,  the  value  of losses  carried
forward  is  indexed  fov  inflation. Therefore,  the  deferral  of tax  payments
should  be discounted  by a  real  rather  than  a  nominal  interest  rate  when
computing  shadow  tax  rates.
The importance  of allowing  for  tax losses  and  related  asymmetries  depends
on the  empirical  significance  of such  phenomena. In the  United  States,  for
example,  Altshuler  and  Auerbach  (1989)  estimated  that  firms  faced  an average
marginal  shadow  tax  rate  of 32%  in the  early  1980s  even  though  the  statutory
marginal  tax  ratc  during  the  period  was  460. The importance  of tax  losses
has  been  demonstrated  for  Canada  as  well (Mintz  1988).
As with  tax  holidays,  a temporary  respite  from  taxes  induced  by tax  loss
carryforwards  can  have  complicated  effects  on the  incentive  to invest. If a
program  of generous  investment  incentives  is  in  place,  investment  by firms
that  are  not  paying  taxes  may  actually  be discouraged.  In such situations,
alternative  forms  of investment  incentives  may  be desired,  such  as direct
grants  that  do  not  work through  the  tax  system.
D.  Uncertainty  and  risk
As the  discussion  of tax  law  asymmetries  illustrates,  uncertainty  about
the  tax  regime  a firm  will face  in the  future  may  exert  a significant  impact
on its  current  investment.  A realistic  treatment  of the  effects  of tax  policy
must  also  account  for  the  uncertainty  that  firms  will  attach  to government
policy  itself. Countries  without  an  established  reputation  for  following
25through  on  announced  policies  may face  difficulties  making  Investment
incentives  effoctive. The  possibility  of dynamic  inconsistency  on the  part  of
governments  has  played  a role  in  past  discussions  of the  design  of tax  policy,
suggesting  why  generous  tax  holidays  might  be necessary  to attract  foreign
investment  (Doyle  and  van  Wijnbergen  1984).
This  issue  has  several  implications  for  the  cost  of capital
specification.  First,  anticipated  tax  rates  that  appear  in the  cost  of
capital  expression  should  not  necessarily  be those  listed  in government
documents.  One  must  allow  past  behavior  to inform  the  determination  of such
tax  rates.  Second,  the  efficacy  of  a  tax  policy  should  be  judged  with  respect
not  to  its  announced  changes,  but  rather  the  changes  it  induces  in  the  policy
anticipations  of  investors.  One  policy  may  appear  more  stimulative  than
another,  but  may be  found  to  be  less  plausible  or  permanent.  For  example,  a
promised  reduction  in  the  tax  rate  *  may  be  reversed  or postponed  more  easily
than  an  investment  tax  credit  already  given  today  can  be  taken  back  from  the
taxpayer  in  the  future  (Hansson  and  Stuart  1989).  Finally,  the  uncertainty
with  respect  to tax  policy  may  cause  risk-averse  investors  to  demand  a risk
premium,  a higher  rate  of expected  return. Hence,  a climate  of uncertainty
about  tax  policy  may, in itself,  discourage  investment.  More generally,  risk
is  a central  aspect  of the  investment  process. Even  with  a riskless  tax
environment,  investors  may  be subject  to considerable  uncertainty  about  the
future  profitability  of their  prospective  investments,  and  may as a result
demand  an expected  rate  of return  considerably  in  excess  of the  risk-free
interest  rate. The  required  rate  of return  r that  appears  in the  user cost  of
capital  expression  (25)  derived  above  must  reflect  this  risk  premium.
Likewise,  the  rate  of discount  applied  to  future  depreciation  allowances  must
account  for  any  risk  associated  with such  tax  benefits. Indeed,  there  is
26nothing  requiring  that  the  discount  rates  appropriate  for  tax  benefits  and
other  after-tax  flows  be the  same. While  such  differences  may  be easily
accommodated  in the  cost  of capital  calculation,  they  make  standard  effective
tax  rate  calculations  based  on a  uniform  rate  of return  inappropriate  and
potentially  quite  misleading  (Auerbach  1983a). The  discount  rates  applicable
to  future  tax  benefits  are  especially  important  in the  design  of tax
incentives.
IV. IhQUAhXLCtt:&lCulating  r  and,
To implement  the  model  of invescment  behavior  derived  in the  previous
section,  one  must incorporate  the  relevant  tax  and  nontax  provisions  affecting
the  firm's  required  rate  of return  r  and  the  present  value  of its  investment
incentives,  r.
A.  Measuring  investment  incentives
Most  countries  provide  schedules  of straight-line  or declining  balance
depreciation  allowances. Such  schedules  may  be extremely  accelerated  relative
to  actual  economic  depreciation.  Turkey,  for  example,  provides  a 50%
declining  balance  depreciation  rate  for  equipment. However,  these  allowances
are  typically  not  indexed  for  inflation,  and  so  must  be discounted  using  a
nominal  ldscount  rate. Mexico  has recently  introduced  the  choice  of a  one-
time,  first-year  deduction,  in  lieu  of  all  subsequent  depreciation  allowances,
that  is  meant  to  provide  roughly  the  present  value  of such  depreciation
allowances  and  protect  them  from  inflation. 13
In  addition,  many  developing  countries  provide  initial  relief  for
investors  over  and  above  normal  depreciation  deductions. In  Turkey,  for
example,  there  are investment  allowances  of 30%  to 60%  for  certain  types  of
27investment.  In  Pakistan,  the  initial  allowance  for  machlnery  and  equipment  is
40%,  with the  allowance  deducted  from  the  basis  used for  subsequent
depreciation.
Other  investment  incentLves  do not  fit  as dlrectly  into  the  expression
for  r  given  above,  but  may  be expressed  in  equivalent  terms. For  example,  the
value  of a subsidized  loan  assocLated  with  a particular  investment  may  be
computed  by estimating  the  present  value  after-tax  of the  interest  and
principal  payments  made  on the  loan  and  subtracting  this  from  the  face  value
of the  obligation,  i.e. the  amount  of  money  initially  provided  to  the
lnvestor,
A soraewhat  more  complicated  investment  scheme  ls the  'investment  fund"  or
(as  it is  referred  to in  Turkey)  "financing  fund'  system. Such  a scheme
provides  firms  with a tax  deduction  for  setting  funds  aside  in the  investment
fund. The  funds  may subsequently  be drawn  down  for  the  purpose  of  making
investments.  Thelr  use in  Sweden  has  been  the  subject  of  previous  discussion
in  the  literature  (e.g.  Taylor  1982,  Sodersten  1988).
In  Turkey,  firms  may  contribute  up to 25%  of their  taxable  profits  to the
fund  in  a given  year  and  receive  a  deduction  for  doing  so.  The  funds  are
deposited  in  a government  bond  account  at the  central  bank,  and  may  be drawn
down  to the  extent  of  new investment  in  the  future. However,  the  firm  must
add the  contributed  funds  back  into  taxable  income  one  year  hence,  so that  it
receives  a one-year  tax  deferral  on the  contribution  regardless  of  how long
the  funds  remain  in the  account. Balancing  the  benefit  associated  with this
tax  deferral  may  be the  cost  of keeping  funds  in an account  yielding  what  may
be a  below-market  interest  rate. Even  if  a net  tax  benefit  remains,  a serious
question  remains  abouz  the  efficacy  of such  a  program  in stimulating
investment.
28The  problem  with investment  fund  schemes  is that  the  tax  benefit  may  well
be unrelated  to the  aaxguIl investment  decision. If firms  are investing  at
least  a  quarter  of their  earnings  anyway  (this  is  not an  especially  high rate
of reinvestment),  then  the  scheme  in  practice  is equivalent  to  one  that  simply
gives  firms  a one  year  tax  deferral  on a quarter  of their  earnings  in exchange
for  placing  these  earnings  in  a government  account  for  a year. While  this
scheme  may  benefit  the  firm,  it  does  not  provide  any subsidy  to  new
investment.  It  encourages  investment  only  in the  sense  that  it reduces  the
effective  tax  burden  on 25%  of the  fuiture  earnings  that  such  investment
generates,  in  precisely  the  way  that  a  very small  reduction  in  the  rate  of
income  tax  r  would.
B.  heasuring  the  recuired  rate  of return
There  are  several  issues  relating  to the  measurement  of the  required  rate
of return  r.  Already  discussed  above  is the  need  to use  realistic  rates  of
return  that  reflect  the  risk  premia  required  by the  market. In  an economy
with  well-developed  financial  markets  and  most  investment  undertaken  by public
corporations,  the  required  nominal  return  to  debt  i in  expression  (2)  would
be well  approximated  by the  observed  nominal  interest  rate,  and the  required
return  to equity  before  personal  taxes,  /(l-H), could  be based  on observed
returns  to  equity. One  could  use  either  an after  corporate  tax  earnings-price
ratio  or a  market  return  (dividend  yield  plus capital  gain)  for  this  purpose.
A benefit  of this  approach  is that  it  may  not require  one to specify  the  tax
treatment  of those  who  supply  the  funds  to corporations. 14
In a developing  country,  such  returns  to  debt  and  equity  may not  be as
easily  observable. In  this  case,  one  may  need to  use information  on  world
interest  rates,  combined  with the  tax  rules  that  apply  to foreign  source
29capital  Income.  For  Oxample,  suppose  the  U.S. interest  rate  ls i*  An
AmoerLcan  investing  in foreign  debt  must  pay  whatever  taxes  are  withheld  abroad
on the  repatriated  Lnterest  income,  plus  U.S. taxes  net  of any  allowable
foreign  tax  credit. (If  the  foreign  taxes  are  fully  creditable,  then  the  U.S.
investor  bears  only  his  U.S. tax  rate  on the  interest  received.) Let  tp  be
this  U.S. tax  rate. Then  the  investor's  net  return  in  the  U.S.  will  be
i*(ltp) - w*,  where  w* is the  U.S. inflation  rate. Assuming  that  exchange
rate  gains  and losses  are  not  taxable,  the  dollar  rate  of return  available
abroad  will  be i(l-tmax)  - w  - d, where  i is  the  foreign  nominal  interest
rate,  tmx  is the  higher  of tp  and  the  rate  of withholding  tax,  a  is the
foreign  inflation  rate  and  d is  the  rate  of foreign  currency  depreciation
against  the  dollar.
Equating  these  two  net  rates  of return  yields:
(26)  i  i*(l-tp)  - (  a*  - f-d)
(1-t  Max)
In  cases  where  the  liability  is denominated  in  dollars,  the  term
(i*  - - d)  vanishes  because  all  transactions  are in the  same  currency. (The
term  will also  vanish  if  purchasing  power  parity  is  satisfied.)  If, in
addition,  taxes  withheld  are  fully  creditable,  then  t  - t  and i  - i* max  p
More generally,  however,  both  of these  sources  of difference  between  i and  i*
will  be present. The low  rates  of income  tax  now in  effect  in  many developed
countries  (including  the  United  States),  may in some  cases  be exceeded  by
foreign  rates  of  withholding  tax  on interest. For  example,  while  the  top  tax
rates  in the  United  States  are  34%  for  corporations  and  33%  for  individuals,
Mexico  withholds  42%  of interest  payments. Further,  some  countries  follow  the
30territorial  approach  to taxation  and  offer  no credit  at  all  for  foreign  taxes
withheld. Even  after  one  allows  for  the  effects  of these  tax  provisions,  it
is  still  necessary  to account  for  differences  in  risk  among  countries  that
would  be reflected  in  required  rates  of return  after-tax. However  uncertain
one  is  about  the  size  of such  risk  premia,  expression  (26)  is  still  useful
because  it shows  how changes  in the  domestic  withholding  tax  rate  affect  the
cost  of  capital,  given  the  level  of risk.
Computing  the  required  return  to equity  by using  rates  of return  observed
abroad  is even  more  problematic  than  in tha  case  of debt.  First  of all, since
equity  normally  bears  a  considerably  greater  fraction  of investment  risk than
debt,  the  problem  of  measuring  risk  premia  is  more significant  in this  case.
Second,  the  tax  treatment  of equity  investment  from  abroad  is  more
complicated  than  the  treatment  of  debt.  The  effective  rate  of tax  depends  not
only  on the  rates  at  which  taxes  are  withheld  and  credited,  but also  on
whether  the  funds  come  from  another  corporation  via foreign  direct  investment
or from  the  household  or  banking  sector,  and  whether  the  equity  funds  for
investment  abroad  come  from  earnings  retained  from  existing  projects  abroad  or
new  equity  contributions  from  the  investing  country  (see  Hartman  1985,  Gordon
1986). A comprehensive  discussion  of this  problem  is  beyond  the  scope  of this
paper. However,  one  may  cite some  basic  results  that  are  helpful  in  guiding
the  specification  of the  required  return  to  equity.
Consider  the  case  of foreign  direct  investment,  in the  "host"  country.
Let  v  - p/(1-0)  be the  required  return  to  equity  in  the  country  from  which  the
funds  come,  the  "home'  country,  and  ignore  for  the  moment  differences  in risk.
If  such  funds  are  sent  abroad  and  all  their  earnings  repatriated,  the  rate  of
return  after  taxes  in the  host  country  must  equal  v plus  any  additional  taxes
imposed  in the  home country  upon  repatriation,  net  of foreign  tax  credits. If
31tf  is  the  foreign  tax  rate  imputed  by  the  home  country  for  such  receipts  from
abroad,  and  t  is  the  home  country's  corporate  tax  rate  on  repatriated
earnings,  then  the  required  return  to  equity  abroad  after  foreign  taxes  will
be  v(l-t  in)/(l-tc),  where  tm* is  the  smaller  of  tf  and  tc  If  the  foreign
tax  rate  used  when  imputing  the  credit  (typically  not  the  statutory  tax  rate  r
but  some  estimate  of  the  presumably  lower  effective  corporate  tax  rate  in  the
host  country)  is  at  least  as  high  as  the  home  country's  tax  rate  on  foreign
earnings,  t*,  then  this  required  rate  is  just  the  rate  of  return  required  at
c
home,  v:  no  further  corporate  taxes  will  be  owed  in  the  home  country.  If
additional  taxes  are  due  on  repatriated  earnings,  however  (this  will  never  be
the  case  for  home  countries  following  the  territorial  approach,  where  tc  - 0)
then  the  required  return  to  equity  will  exceed  v.
When  foreign  direct  investment  is  funded  by  retained  earnings  already  in
the  host  country,  however,  the  calculation  of  the  required  return  to  equity  v
is  simpler.  In  this  case,  the  tax  treatment  of  repatriated  funds  is
irrelevant,  since  repatriated  funds  will  bear  the  same  rate  of  tax  and,  in
present  value,  the  same  tax  burden  regardless  of  when  they  are  repatriated
(liartman  1985).  Thus,  the  required  rate  of  return  will  always  be  v.
Therefore,  for  countries  with  tax  rates  sufficiently  high  to  provide  enough
foreign  tax  credits  to  offset  further  corporate  tax  liability  upon
repatriation,  the  required  rate  of  return  to  equity  after  corporate  taxes
(except  for  differences  in  risk)  will  be  the  required  rate  of  return  to  equity
in  the  countries  supplying  the  investment  funds.
Thus,  for  both  debt  and  equity,  the  major  difficulty  involved  in
estimating  the  firm's  required  return  is  the  estimation  of  the  domestic  risk
premium.
32V. 
This  paper  has  reviewed  the  literature  on  investment  and  the  cost  of
capital,  showing  how  the  effects  of  tax  and  nontax  government  policies  should
be  incorporated  in  the  analysis  of  investment  behavior.  The  methodology  is  in
several  respects  more  general  than  calculations  of  tax  wedges  and  effective
tax  rates.  Its  application  in  a  developing-country  context  should  provide
light  on  the  ability  of  policy  to  influence  investment,  the  efficacy  of  those
policies  currently  being  pursued,  and  the  appropriate  directions  for  reform.
33Table  I
Notation
X(.) - general  production  function,  with  capital,  labor  and  materials  as
arguments.
F(-) - residual  production  function,  with  capital  as  an argument,  obtained
by subtracting  labor  and  materials  costs  from  X(n) and  solving  for
labor  and  materials  as function  of K. (defined  in equation  (10)).
G(.) - residual  production  function  normalized  for  fluctuations  in the
profitability  of  capital  (defined  in (13)).
e  - term  representing  the  fluctuation  in the  profitability  of
capital  due  to  variation  in input  prices.  (defined  in (13)).
6  capital  depreciation  rate  (geometric).
i  - nominal  interest  rate.
b  - debt-value ratio.
x  - inflation rate.
I'  - required  real  after-tax  return  to  equity  holders.
v  - -p/l-O  real  required  return  to  equity,  before  personal  taxes.
n  . real return  to  bondholders  after  tax  (defined  in (16)).
r  . weighted  average  cost  of capital  (defined  in  equation  (2)).
p  - output goods price.
pW  - world output goods price.
v  - material goods price.
vm  - world material goods price.
g  - capital goods price.
q  - capital  goods  price,  including  marginal  adjustment  costs.
0  - adjustment cost parameter.
w  - nominal wage rate.
9  - effective  household  tax  rate  on equity  income.
k  - investment tax credit.
34D(a)  *  depreciation  deduction  for  a  capital  good  of age a.
r  present  value  of investment  credits  and  dopreciation  deductions
(defined  in equation  (3)).
*c  effective  corporate  tax  rate  (defined  in  (15)).
aT  '  *effective  total  tax  rate  (defined  in (17)).
tp  - personal  tax  rate  of  bondholders.
Tm  tariff  rate  on material  good.
Tp  tariff  rate  on output  good.
tX  excise  tax  on  material  good.
35This  appendix  sketches  how the  decision  rule  given  in  equations  (24)  and
(25)  can  be  derived  as a  solution  of  the  linearized  version  of  the  Eular
equation  (21).
For  simplicity,  we normalize  the  output  price,  p, to one.  First  (letting
Ft(K)  - BtG(K)),  express  (21)  as  a differential  equation  in  4:
(Al)  4  - - G'(K)G("r.)  + q(r+5)  -q(l.  r)
1-r  1-r
Linearizing  around  the  steady  state  (where  q - g and  r  - o),  we  obtain
(letting  * denote  steady  state  values):
(A2)  4  u  -G"(K  )  (1-r  )  (K-K  )  + (r+S)(q-g)
l.r*
- KD  *  ((l-v)-(l-v  )j ,  - K)1  (B- )
G(K-  )  (1-F
+  G*  [(1  )  (1-F  r)  g  *l-
(1-r  )  (-
Using  expression  (20)  for  q and  the  fact  that  G'(K )  - c  - g (r+.  ) (l-r  ),
we obtain:
(A3)  Kt  '(r+6) K  t  ~t00
where  a  - -G"/G',  xt  _  °(r+  KJ 11  - a*t,  and
36(A) at  (1-,).  (1v  )  +  (-rt)  '  (1-r)  0  0  *  1  (1:r)
(1-  t)  (1-  r)  6*  r+5  (l-r  )
The equation (A3)  has  roots:
(A5)  r+6 +  .(r+6)2 +  4a(r+g)
- 0  i- 1,2
2
Solving the unstable root, °2>  0, forward, one obtains the first-order
equation:
2  (8-t)
(A6)  Kt  °1 K t  - 2 (t-t  da
which may be  rewritten as  the partial adjustment model given in expressi-
A  *  nt
(23)  in the text  where Kt-  K  a  and
_  ZU-o 2(s-t)
(A7)  a  - r  °  *  a  ds
t  t  2
By  another  first-order  approximation,
A  *  A 
(A8)  G  (K)-  G'(K)  + C(K)  (Kt -K)
*  A  *
- G'(K  )(1 - °(Kt - K ))
_  G'(K )(l+0  t)
37Substitution  of (W7)  and  the  value  of  GI  (K  ) into  (AS)  yields:
A  *u2  (s-t)  *
(A9)  G(K  t)  J  e  22  a  lg(r+8)(l-rL)  (1  +  as))  ds
However,  from  inspection  of (A4),  we observe  that  a  is simply  the
flrst-order  deviation  of c5 as defined  in (25)  from  c
*
(AlO)  cs - &(r+8)(l-r  ) (1  +  a)
S (l-r  )
Substitution  of (A10)  into  (A9)  yields  expression  (24)  in  the  text.
When there  are  constant  returns  to  scale  in  production,  a1 - - 0.
Hence,  the  solution  based  on (A6)  is:
(All)  Kt  - r 2  (st  aa ds  - 2  e  s2  a  ds
0  t  0
-a (s-t)
co  2  *  1
- I  I  o  e  c  (l+a) ds  +  -
c*0  t  2  0
-o  (s-t)
1  1 rae  2  c  ds
- J~t  2  s  d
0  c*
Once  again,  investment  depends  on  current  a-d  future  values  of the
instanteneous  user  cost  of  capital,  c.
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40Footnotes
1.  A particular  example  of a  production  structure  giving  rise  to F(s)  having
this  separable  form  is  given  below.
2.  As  has long  been  recognized,  a  problem  arises  if  the  underlying
production  function  X(.)  satisfies  constant  returns  to scale. In that  case,
the  derivative  of the  production  function  F(s)  is  not a function  of  K, so that
expression  (14)  is  overdetermined.  In this  case,  the  optimal  capital  stock  is
either  zero,  infinite  or indeterminate,  depending  on  whether  or  not (14)  is
satisfied.  It is  therefore  necessary  to  assume  either  decreasing  returns  to
scale  in  K, L and  K, that  the  capital  stock  cannot  be adjusted
instantaneously,  or that  the  firm's  marginal  revenue  curve  is  not  horizontal.
The  latter  two  assumptions  also  make the  characterization  of the  firm's
decision  more  realistic. This is  discused  further  below.
3.  One  could  also  assume  equal  before-tax  returns  (the  "fixed-p"  case)  or
equal  intermediate  returns  (the  "fixed-r"  case). The  problem  of  choosing
among  these  assumptions  is  due  to the  fact  that  debt  and  equity  coexist  even
though  the  tax  wedges  imposed  on debt  and  equity  returns  differ. This
highlights  a limitation  of the  procedure,  its  ignorance  of risk  and  other
considerations  that  might  help  explain  observed  patterns  of financial
structure  and  asset  ownership.
4.  The  whole  function  F(-)  has the  form  G(.)G(w/p,v/p),  where
G(K)  _
5.  Given  this  formulation,  one  can  readily  see the  relationship  of this
discussion  to the  concept  of effective  protection.  Given  fixed  world  prices
p  for  the  output  good  and  vw for  the  input  good,  the institution  of tariffs
Tp  on the  output  good  and  Tv on the  input  good  causes  the  term  pg in the
denominator  of (14)  to  equal
pW  (1+T )  w'1l/(# )[1-m(vw/pw)(l+Tv  )/(l+Tp)
If  we define  T  to  be the  uniform  tariff  that  provides  the  same
protection  for  the  Industry  and  hence  the  same  desired  capital  stock,  we
obtain:
[1  - m(v/p)  1(l+T  )/(l+Tp)]]  1/(1  )
To - (1 + T )  - e  P  ~~~1 m  (v/p)]
which  is less  that  T  if  and  only if  T  >  Tp.  The  relationship  of effective
protection  to  effectYve  tax  rates  is dYrcussed  by Guisinger  (1988).
416.  Although  the  result  will  not  be  used  here,  the  convex  adjustment  cost
model  can  also  be used  to provide  a rigorous  underpinning  for  the "q"  theory
of investment  first  envisioned  by Tobin  (1969),  under  which  the  firm's
investment  behavior  is  related  to its  market  value  (Hayashi  1982). Given  the
market  value  of the  firm,  one  can  then  regress  investment  on the  tax-
adjusted  q ratio  of  market  value  to asset  replacement  cost  to obtain  estimates
of  the  adjustment  cost  function  (Summers  1981). Unfortunately,  this  approach
does  not  permit  one  to  measure  directly  the  impact  of future  costs  of capital
on investment.
7.  An alternative  approach,  found  in  Pindyck  and  Rotenberg  (1983),  is to
estimate  the  production  function  and  adjustment  cost  parameters  directly  from
the  Euler  equation,  without  solving  for  the  underlying  investment  rule.  That
is,  instead  of solving  for  an  expression  for  K that  is  not a function  of R,
they  estimate  the  Euler  equation  obtained  by substituting  (20)  into (21)  with
instrumental  variables,  treating  K as an endogenous  regressor. Like the
approach  of estimating  the  Euler  equation  based  on (21)  alone,  i.e..
regressing  investment  on  q, this  technique  does  not  provide  any insight  into
the  effects  of future  costs  of capital  on investment.
A
8.  When there  are  constant  returns  to  scale  in  production,  K is  either
infinite,  zero  or indeterminate.  However,  even  in the  former  two  cases,  the
rate  of investment  will still  depend  on the  costs  of capital  as  defined  in
(24).
9.  Given  the  formulation  of the  problem,  these  roots  have the  form:
ai  - (r+6)  .(r+6)2  + 4e(r+6)/0  i  - 1, 2
2
where  e  - G"/G'  at the  point  of linearization.  When there  are  constant
returns  to  scale,  e - 0.  If,  however,  the  firm  faces  a downward-sloping
demand  curve,  then  the  relevant  elasticity  e  would  be based  on pG rather  than
G.  The  negative  relationship  between  price  and  output  would  impart  more
curvature  to the  marginal  revenue  product  dSpG).  Even  with  G"  - 0, there  would
dK
still  be curvature  in  the  revenue  resulting  from  additions  to the  capital
stock.
10. A full  analysis  of the  Mexican  reform  would  be considerably  more
complicated,  for  it  would  require  inclusion  of the  program's  other  changes,
notably  the  effects  indexation  of depreciation  allowances  and  interest
payments. The former  effects  would  be incorporated  via  the  allowances  D(e)  in
the  calculation  of r  and r  using  (22),  and the  latter  would  be treated  through
induced  changes  in  the  corporate  cost  of funds  r.
11.  For  further  discussion,  see  Auerbach  (1989).
12.  This  assumes  that  the  firm  cannot  defer  depreciation  allowances  occuring
during  the  holiday  period. If  they  can,  there  would  be a  much smaller  decline
in  r,  due  only to  the  discounting  of these  delayed  deductions. In such  a
42case,  the  Incentive  to in-fost  during  the  holiday  period  would  be  much greater
an r  would  be larger  and r  smaller.  See  Mintz (1989)  for  further  discussion.
13.  Such  a scheme,  and  its  advantages,  is  discussed  in  Auerbach  and  Jorgenson
1980.
14.  This  simplicity  is  based  on the  q  - 10  assumption  thaF  a dollar  invested
by the  firm  costs  shareholders  a dollar  and  that  a dollar  of earnings  is  worth
a dollar  to shareholders  whether  distributed  or not. Under  the  "tax
capitalization  hypothesis,  the  ratio  of shareholders'  value  to firm  value,  q,
may  be less  that  one,  equal  to  the  ratio  of the  after-tax  proceeds  of a dollar
distributed  to those  of a  dollar  retained  by the  firm. In this  case,  an
appropiate  measure  of equity  cost  based  on observed  earnings  would  multiply
these  earnings  by q. (see  Auerbach  1983b),  to  offset  the  multiplication  by q
already  implicit  in  the  firm's  value. To make this  correction,  however,  one
would  have to  know  the  tax  rates  of the  'representative"  shareholder.
Whether  the  "q  - 1"  or 'tax  capitalization"  view depends  on the  firm's
marginal  source  of funds. If the  firm  finances  its  marginal  investments  using
retained  earnings,  it faces  a lower  cost  of capital  because  a dollar  of funds
retained  does  not  cost  taxable  investors  one  dollar. There  may  be other
reasons  why firms  face  a lower  cost  of  capital  when  using  internal  funds,  for
example  becau  e of information  asymmetries.  One  way if identifying  which
equity  regime  a firm  is in is  by the  level  of its  internal  funds. Within  the
cost  of  capital  framework,  one  could  posit  that  some  function  of cash flow
determines  the  appropiate  adjustment  to  observed  earnings-price  ratios  (i.e.,
whether  to  multiply  earnings  by some  value  of q  <  1.)  An alternative,  more  ad
hgl approach,  has  been to  put  cash  flow  separately  into  the  investment
equation. Doing  so  has  recently  been found  to  be quite  significant  in
explaining  the  investment  behavior  of smaller  U.S. firms  (Fazzari,  Hubbard  and
Petersen  1988).
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